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LESION BEYOND MOIETY; LA MOITIÉ DE QUOI, 
EXACTEMENT? 
RESCISSION NOT SUPPORTED BY MINERAL 
SPECULATION: HARRUFF V. KING 
Leona E. Scoular* 
Recently, in Harruff v. King,1 the Louisiana Third Circuit 
Court of Appeal considered whether sellers may seek rescission for 
lesion beyond moiety when the fair market value of the land is 
later estimated to be much higher on account of the speculated 
value of undeveloped minerals in the land.2 In its analysis, the 
Harruff court relied on several provisions of law, including the 
articles of the Civil Code that pertain to rescission of sales for 
lesion beyond moiety;3 the sections of the Mineral Code that 
prohibit rescission of sales of mineral rights for lesion beyond 
moiety;4 Louisiana jurisprudence regarding, first, the evidentiary 
standard required for rescission for lesion beyond moiety,5 second, 
the rights that accompany ownership of immovable property,6 and, 
finally, the “speculative nature” of minerals.7 The analysis takes a 
significantly different turn than the First Circuit used in the case of 
Hornsby v. Slade, which dealt with the same general issue.8  
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 1. Harruff v. King, 2013-940 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/14/14), 139 So. 3d 1062.  
 2. Id. at 1064.  
 3. LA. C.C. art. 2589.  
 4. LA. MIN. CODE art. 17 (2000).  
 5. See Cascio v. Twin Cities Development, LLC, 45,634–CA (La. App. 2 
Cir. 9/22/10) 48 So. 3d 341; and Dosher v. Louisiana Church of God, 71 So. 2d 
868 (La. 1954). 
 6. Jones v. First National Bank, Ruston, Louisiana, 41 So. 2d 811 (La. 
1949). 
 7. Wilkins v. Nelson, 99 So. 607 (La. 1924).  
 8. See Hornsby v. Slade, infra n. 41. 





Plaintiffs in this case are the sellers, two sisters, Tammy Renea 
Martin Harruff and Amy Lynn Bilodeau [hereinafter “the sisters”], 
who sold their undivided interests in two tracts of land located in 
Natchitoches Parish and Red River Parish, near the Haynesville 
Shale, to defendants, Richard King, Kyle King, and Renee King 
[hereinafter “the Kings”].9 A subsequent purchaser of the same 
undivided interests in the same immovable property, Edgar Cason, 
is also a plaintiff in this matter.10 The first sale, to the Kings, was 
executed on July 21, 2009 for the price of $175,000.00.11 The 
second sale, to Edgar Cason, was executed on November 30, 2009 
for the price of $375,000.00.12 After the second sale, plaintiffs 
filed a petition seeking rescission of the first sale for lesion beyond 
moiety in the Tenth Judicial District Court for the Parish of 
Natchitoches.13 The sisters presented testimony by expert 
witnesses as to the fair market value of the property sold and the 
trial court acknowledged that there was evidence of the value of 
mineral rights in the area.14 The trial court granted rescission for 
lesion beyond moiety, finding the fair market value of the sisters’ 
undivided interests in the two tracts of land totaled $687,061.08.15  
Defendants appealed alleging six assignments of error.16 
Pertinent to the discussion of lesion beyond moiety are the first 
three assignments of legal error and manifest error. The first 
asserts that the trial court erred by allowing the valuation of 
speculative gaseous minerals.17 The second asserts that the trial 
court erred by valuing the property as a mineral-producing 
property rather than a recreational property, the valuation being of 
                                                                                                             
 9. Harruff, 139 So. 3d at 1064.  
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 1064-65. 
 12. Id. at 1065.  
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 1065-66. 
 17. Id. 




a different state than the property was in at the time of the 
challenged sale.18 The third asserts that the trial court erred in 
making a finding of fact regarding the valuation reports by mixing 
the reports of two experts and adding a purported mineral valuation 
to achieve the amalgamated value awarded.19 The Third Circuit’s 
ruling on the first assignment of error determined the second and 
third assignments of error.20 
II. DECISION OF THE COURT 
The Third Circuit reversed the decision of the Tenth Judicial 
District Court, that had granted rescission of a sale of land based 
on lesion beyond moiety, on the grounds that lesion beyond moiety 
does not apply to the speculated value of minerals in the land that 
have not been accessed.21 The court determined that the value of 
undeveloped minerals is too speculative to be included in the fair 
market value considered as the basis of a claim for rescission for 
lesion beyond moiety.22 The competing facts of the case were 
opposing expert witness valuations of the immovable property that 
was the subject of the July 21, 2009 sale to the Kings.23 The court 
reviewed whether the Tenth Judicial District Court’s decision was 
legally correct or incorrect24 and reviewed findings of fact under 
the manifest error rule.25  
The Harruff court first considered Louisiana Civil Code article 
2589, which provides for rescission of the sale of a corporeal 
                                                                                                             
 18. Harruff, 139 So. 3d at 1066.  
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 1070-71. 
 21. Id. at 1070. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 1068-69. 
 24. Id. at 1066 (citing Dugan v. Gen. Servs. Co., 01-511 (La. App. 3 Cir. 
10/31/01) 799 So. 2d 760, 763, writ denied, 841 So. 2d 942 (La. 2002) (trial 
court’s erroneous application of law eliminates trial court’s entitlement to 
deference by the reviewing court)). 
 25. Id. at 1066 (citing Cormier v. Comeaux, 98-C-2378 (La. 1999) 748 So. 
2d 1123 (setting forth a two-part test for reversing factual findings: no 
reasonable factual basis for finding in record and record shows finding is 
manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong)).  




immovable for lesion beyond moiety. The seller may rescind the 
sale of a corporeal immovable when the price is less than one half 
of the fair market value of the thing.26 The Louisiana Supreme 
Court held in Jones v. First National Bank, Ruston, Louisiana that 
the value of an immovable includes the value of mineral interests 
or rights when the mineral interest or right is sold with the 
immovable.27 The mineral rights in an immovable are included in 
the bundle of rights that make up the ownership of the underlying 
immovable and are therefore part of the corporeal immovable.28 A 
seller petitioning for rescission for lesion beyond moiety must 
show “clear and exceedingly strong evidence” that the fair market 
value of his property is more than twice the price in the challenged 
sale.29  
Second, the Harruff court shifts its analysis over to mineral 
rights and away from corporeal immovables.30 The court states that 
the nature of minerals is speculative31 and this prevents the 
valuation of minerals.32 Louisiana Mineral Code article 6 provides 
that the ownership of land does not include the ownership of liquid 
or gaseous minerals, but only the exclusive right to explore and 
develop the land for the production of minerals and to reduce them 
to possession and ownership.33 Louisiana Mineral Code article 17 
prohibits rescission of a sale of a mineral right for lesion beyond 
moiety.34  
The Third Circuit comes back to the plaintiffs’ failure to meet 
the high evidentiary standard of “clear and exceedingly strong 
evidence” as reason for reversing the lower court’s judgment for 
                                                                                                             
 26. LA. C.C. art. 2589.  
 27. Jones v. First National Bank, Ruston, Louisiana, 38056, 41 So. 2d 811 
(La. 1949).  
 28. Harruff, 139 So. 3d at 1067. 
 29. Id. at 1067-68 (citing Pierce v. Roussel, 79 So.2d 567, 571 (La. 1955)). 
 30. Id. at 1069. 
 31. Id. at 1069 (citing Wilkins v. Nelson, 99 So. 607 (La. 1924)). 
 32. Id. at 1069 (citing Cascio v. Twin Cities Development, LLC, 45,634-CA 
(La. App. 2 Cir. 9/22/10) 48 So. 3d 341). 
 33. Id. at 1069. 
 34. Id. at 1070. 




lesion beyond moiety.35 The estimates of the sisters’ expert witness 
were based on many assumptions beginning with the assumption 
that the mineral rights would ever be leased and that minerals 
would ever be produced.36 The Third Circuit determined that the 
sisters’ expert witness testimony was merely “speculation laced 
with hopeful thinking.”37 The Third Circuit held that the trial court 
erred in relying on the sisters’ expert witness and found that the 
sisters’ real estate expert’s estimate of the value of the land, 
without any consideration of the value of mineral interests, was the 
best evidence of the fair market value of the land, that is 
$166,400.00.38  
III. COMMENTARY 
The Third Circuit in Harruff discusses provisions of the 
Louisiana Mineral Code and the “speculative nature of minerals” 
more than the basic evidentiary burden.39 The discussion of the 
treatment of mineral rights does not assist in resolving the issue in 
the case. Louisiana Mineral Code article 17 applies to mineral 
rights, which are the exclusive rights discussed in Louisiana 
Mineral Code article 6 once they have been segregated from the 
ownership of the underlying immovable.40 In this case, the 
plaintiffs sold the whole ownership of the immovable property 
including those exclusive rights discussed in Louisiana Mineral 
Code article 6. Even considering the sale of land valued primarily 
                                                                                                             
 35. Id. at 1069. 
 36. Id. at 1070. 
 37. Id. at 1069.  
 38. Id. at 1070-71. 
 39. Id. at 1069. 
 40. See also LA. MIN. CODE art. 16 (providing an illustrative list of mineral 
rights and that all mineral rights are created by the landowner), and LA. MIN. 
CODE art. 2 (providing that the provisions of the Mineral Code only apply when 
the Mineral Code expressly or impliedly provides for a particular situation), and 
LA. MIN. CODE art. 2, cmt. (explaining that the article was intended to prevent 
the application of the Mineral Code to other types of controversies properly 
resolved under the Civil Code because the Mineral Code was tailored to meet 
the special needs of Louisiana’s mineral industries).  




on speculation that there may be minerals accessible form that land 
falls within the scope of Louisiana Mineral Code article 17, this 
would preclude the remedy of lesion in all such cases, defeating 
the public policy concerns reflected in Louisiana Civil Code article 
2589. Therefore, Louisiana Mineral Code article 17 does not apply 
to this case. Further, the Third Circuit discussed jurisprudence 
recognizing the “speculative nature of mineral exploration” 
without any authority to connect a speculative nature with an 
absolute inability to meet the evidentiary standard and in spite of 
the case of Jones v. First National Bank, Ruston, Louisiana. The 
trial court relied on Jones for the rule that when land and mineral 
interests are sold together, the mineral interests are to be included 
in the value of the immovable property. The Louisiana Supreme 
Court in Jones reversed the dismissal of a petition for rescission 
for lesion beyond moiety when, considering mineral interests, the 
property value was increased by more than twice as much. The one 
significant distinction between Jones and this case is that mineral 
leases were executed between sale and the lesionary claim in 
Jones, providing more evidence of value for the Jones court to 
consider than was available to the Third Circuit in Harruff.  
The approach taken by the Third Circuit to the lesion issue 
presented in this case can be contrasted with that taken by the 
Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal in Hornsby v. Slade in 
2003 on similar facts.41 Plaintiff-appellee Hornsby sold her interest 
in a tract of land to defendant-appellant Slade and later sought 
rescission for lesion beyond moiety.42 Hornsby asserted that the 
fair market value of the land, which featured significant deposits of 
gravel (a kind of mineral), was more than double the sale price 
considering the value of the gravel.43 The First Circuit majority 
concluded, consistent with the Louisiana Supreme Court’s holding 
                                                                                                             
 41. Hornsby v. Slade, 2002 CA 2138 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/20/03) 854 So. 2d 
441.  
 42. Id. 442.  
 43. Id. 




in Jones, that when the passing of mineral rights was with the sale 
of the underlying immovable, the sale is subject to rescission for 
lesion beyond moiety because the value of the minerals increases 
the value of the land.44 The First Circuit majority distinguished this 
from the sale of segregated mineral rights, which are incorporeal 
immovables, and not subject to rescission for lesion beyond 
moiety.45 The analysis of the First Circuit majority turned on 
corporeality, perhaps because it considered the value of the mineral 
rather than the value of the mineral right.46 Gravel is a solid 
mineral; solid minerals are an integral part of the land and 
therefore corporeal movables.47 The mineral right to gravel, when 
segregated from the bundle of rights belonging to the owner of the 
underlying immovable, is an incorporeal immovable and not 
subject to rescission for lesion beyond moiety.48 The First Circuit 
majority specifically referred to “mineral rights” as being 
insusceptible of lesionary inquiry because of their speculative 
nature, not the estimated fair market value of minerals in the sale 
of an underlying immovable.49 The Hornsby majority affirmed the 
lower court’s judgment for rescission for lesion beyond moiety 
because the sale was of a corporeal immovable and the fair market 
value of the immovable was more than twice the sale price.50  
Judge McClendon dissented from the majority opinion in 
Hornsby, reasoning that Louisiana Mineral Code article 17 may 
apply to the sale of immovable property in cases where there are 
minerals beneath the surface of the property.51 The underlying 
argument, which is perhaps not as clearly articulated as one might 
have hoped, seems to be that the Mineral Code provisions apply in 
this case because the disputed amount contributing to a fair market 
                                                                                                             
 44. Id. at 445.  
 45. Id. at 445-46.  
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 445.  
 48. Id. at 445-46.  
 49. Id. at 446.  
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 




value more than double the sale price is based on the value of 
minerals or mineral rights. Judge McClendon criticizes the 
majority for considering the value of gravel instead of considering 
the value of the mineral right to explore, mine, and remove gravel; 
and thereby stopping the analysis because the sale of mineral rights 
are not subject to rescission for lesion beyond moiety.52 Indeed, 
because the minerals do not exist for the purpose of ownership 
until they are extracted,53 it may seem illogical to consider their 
value in a valuation of the land containing them. Further, because 
what is sold is the mineral right in the bundle of rights that 
comprise ownership of the land54 and because lesion beyond 
moiety is not a ground for rescission of a sale of mineral rights,55 it 
seems to follow logically that a sale of land may not be rescinded 
when the difference in value is based on the valuation of mineral 
rights.  
The Harruff court did not follow the approach suggested by 
Judge McClendon, and with good reason. His approach requires us 
to treat a contract of one type as though it were really a different 
type of contract. Judge McClendon is essentially proposing that, 
under certain circumstances, we treat a deal that is structured as a 
sale of immovable property as though it were a sale of a segregated 
mineral right.56 There is no sound legal basis for treating one 
conventional obligation as though it were some other conventional 
obligation, save, perhaps, where the obligation is simulated. It is a 
settled principle that even when a conventional obligation purports 
to be something other than the type of conventional obligation it 
really is, a simulation, the obligation must be treated as it really is 
between the parties.57 But in Hornsby, as in Harruff, there was no 
                                                                                                             
 52. Id. at 447-48. 
 53. Id. at 447, citing United States v. 43.42 Acres of Land, 520 F.Supp. 
1042, 1045 (W.D.La. 1981). 
 54. Jones, 41 So. 2d at 813 citing La. C.C. art. 505.  
 55. LA. MIN. CODE art. 17. 
 56. Hornsby, 854 So. 2d at 447-48. 
 57. See LA. C.C. arts. 2026-2027.  




simulation: the parties did not really intend to transfer just a 
mineral interest on the land in question; rather, they intended to 
transfer the entire ownership of that land. Unfortunately, the Third 
Circuit likewise muddled the distinction between valuation of 
minerals as part of the value of immovable property and the value 
and sale of a mineral right.  
Nor did the Harruff court follow the approach suggested by the 
Hornsby majority. The Harruff court examined the mineral value 
as though it were the value of a mineral right segregated by the 
owner of the underlying immovable. The court need not seek to 
extend the limitation to only corporeal immovables of lesion 
beyond moiety to exclude mineral values in all cases because the 
evidentiary standard is high enough to prevent rampant lesionary 
claims that may be lacking in merit. Further, the case may arise 
wherein the value of undeveloped minerals in immovable property 
can be shown with clear and exceedingly strong evidence, but in 
the Third Circuit, that case will now have to challenge the 
precedence set by Harruff.  
The Harruff court could have used the same analysis as the 
Hornsby court and determined that lesionary inquiry is appropriate, 
but the court still could have held that rescission is not appropriate 
in this case. Considering the high evidentiary standard, requiring 
“clear and exceedingly strong evidence,”58 and the court’s 
determination that the sisters’ expert witness testimony was merely 
“speculation laced with hopeful thinking,”59 it was not necessary 
for the court to discuss the “speculative nature of minerals” as a 
general principal that would apply to any case of undeveloped 
minerals.60 The evidentiary standard was simply not met in this 
case,61 but this should not preclude all future sellers from proving 
                                                                                                             
 58. Harruff, 139 So. 3d at 1067 (quoting Pierce v. Roussel, 79 So.2d 567, 
571 (La. 1955)).  
 59. Id. at 1069.  
 60. Id. at 1070.  
 61. Id. at 1069-70. 




by clear and exceedingly strong evidence the fair market value of 
undeveloped minerals in immovable property they have sold.  
